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Rights and the Right to Know 
Frederic" Schauer 
It is probably not too •uch of an exaggeration to say that 
the •ri�ht to know- is the leading rallying cry for contempor­
ary American journalism. Indeed, thia characterization is re­
inforced by the Code of Ethics of the Society of Professional 
Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, which describes the public's 
right to know as �the overriding •ission of the mass me d i a . ­
and urges that •journal ists •ust be free of obligations to any 
interest other than the publi c•s right to know.-
Reliance on the right to knov takes nuN!rous f onns. At 
times the ri�ht to know ia claimed by a journal i s t  who vishes 
special access to a prison, a courtroom, the scene of an 
accident, or governN!nt documents. At other times the right to 
know ia used to justify the vriting or publication of a nevs 
story that is arguably defa..atory, or that may cons titute an 
invasion of privacy. And the right to know is often, especially 
recently, relied upon as the primary right that ge-oerates the 
derivative right of the journal ist to refuse to reveal con­
fidential sources, or refuse to give evidence at a trial or 
before a grand jury. 
One of the most intriguing features of this repeated 
reliance on the right to know is the fact that i t ,  whatever it 
i s ,  is characteri�ed i n  terms of rights . This is more than-a 
linguistic technical i t y .  Aa soon ae ve couch an argu�nt or a 
claim in the language of rights, ve raise the stakes of �ora l ,  
political, o r  legal discourse. I When ve assert the eKistence 
of a right. and when ve rely on that right, we implicitly 
maintain that it would be wrong to interfere with the exercise 
of that right, in a way that makes the claim substantially 
stronger and different in kind frOlfll a claim premised merely on 
an interes t ,  a reaso n ,  a justification, or a policy. 
In •iev of the importance we attach to rights, and in view 
of this special force of a claim of right, it seems especially 
appropriate to analyze carefully the right to know. Who 
possesses a right to know? WhOM is it a right agains t? What 
i s  the source of the right? What subjects or acti·vities does it 
encOlfllpass? What benefits or claims attach to being the holder 
of a right to know? What derivative or more specific ritJhtB 
does it generate? In what nor!l&tive system - moral, political, 
or legal - does it reside? Is the right to knov enforceable, 
and, if so, by whom, against whom, and how? In looking at 
these questione, I want to engage primarily in a process of 
cbnceptual analysis, a process that seems especially necessary 
with reference to the right to know. In the p·rocess I may 
insert occasionally sotlle not11lAtive argume nt, but this is 
undoubtedly subservient to my primary aim of ,clearing up a 
considerable degree of conceptual confusion. 
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The etandard dietinct ione betveen r>sitive and negative 
freedom, or positive and �gative liberty, can, for purpoees 
of explorin« the right to know be rr anelated into 1 diatinction 
between poeitive right s and negative ri�hte. Negative right•, 
•i•ilar to Hohfeldian privilege• or libertie a , 3  entitle the 
right-holder to be free frc:a eoee f orw of external interference 
if and vhen he choose• to engage in the activity encompa eeed by 
the right. Many of the moat COtd!On ·human righ t • , - ae vell aa 
ll08t American cOllAti tutional rights, are negative rights or 
libertie. of this variety. Some of t heae righte, euch ae the 
right• to f reedaa of speech, or freedom of religion, or freedo� 
t o  travel, relate to particular activities that mi�ht be 
pureued by the right-holder. Others, euch ae the right to be 
free f rCJlll unrea.onable searches and eeizurea, or the right to 
f reedo• f rOlll torture. relate to a more general right not to be 
interfered vith in the nor .. 1 pursuit of one '• life. But 
regardless of -1.nor variations, what characterize• all of 
these negative right• ia that they require of �ove['llJlent 
nothing other than non-interference with what the right-holde r ,  
u1ing h i •  own reeource e, choo1ee t o  do. Theae are negative 
righte bec.auee they require of the etate only a negative-­
refraining froo interference. 
Positive right•, on the other hand, require eomething eore 
than non-interference by the party under the correlative 
obligation. Positive right• require that Bo1Dething positive be 
done to or for the right-holder. The correlative obligation to 
perform this act -y be placed on other 1nd1viduale, but, in 
this conte�t, i t  ia auch more likely to reside in government . 
The right to euetenance, or the right to ehelter, for example, 
right• frequently 11entioned i n  .anifeatoa regarding hulUn 
right•, are not 11erely claims to a right to non-interference. 
Those who advocate a right to sustenance are claiming llUch eore 
than that t he  government ehould not take away the food that the 
citizen eecure1 for hiese lf. lather, they advocate that the 
government take po1itive etepe to provide food for the citizen. 
Thie notion of a correlative affi'l'11Mlt1ve duty, rather than ..ere 
paeeive non-interference, also characterize• 1uch clai.ed 
positive right• aa the right to e•plo,.-.ent, the right to 
•helter, the right to .edical treat11ent, aDd many others . 
Once we underetand thi• distinction between positive and 
negative righte, ft can eee that the riMht to kno.. can con­
ceivably be characterized aa a negative right or a e a  positive 
right. tut when characteYized ae a ne«ative right, however, 
the notion of a riRht to know �rge• on the trivial. For •• a 
negative right alone, the right to kn<Jlf would •upport little 
.ore than acceae to infon.ation that the citizen or journalist 
would othe�wiee be able to obtain ueing his awo reeourcee . The 
right to know in the negative eeft9e would alao support the 
abeence of restriction• o n  the diaaeaination of infonMtion by 
willing epeakere, writer•, or publishers. and in this eense it 
3
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i s  of course not t r i vial.4 But clai .. of rights can be tri­
•ial1 or •islead i ng 1  if in fact t he  claimed right adds nothi� 
beyond llhat la already contained in so11e e�isting right. 
Thus1 the right to know in this sense is trivial if it adds 
l i ttle if anythini to the standard liberty forwulation of the 
rights to freedom of speech and freedma of the press. In this 
respect the right to know may be a sh()rthand expression for 
soee of the standard consequentialist arguments for f reedma of 
speech and freedom of the press, such as the argument that free 
speech leads to discovery of truth, anid the ar�ument that free 
speech is necessary for infot'19ed decisionma�ing in a deW>cratic 
society. 6 Because these aod related argu11ents turn on the free 
flow of infonaation, rather than on some particular benefit 
that accrues to the speaker, they can in one sense be described 
in terwa of the right to know. Thus, to the extent that these 
or si�ilar arguments focusing on the benefit& free speech 
brings to l isteners or to society in general are accepted. the 
right to know can be said to provide the underpinnings for free 
speech aod free press rights of great strength. But the right 
to know in the negative sense s t i l l  has l i t t l e  independent 
force in the sense of generating rights beyond those protected 
by rights already commonly acknowledged and enforced. This 
does not mean that knowledge i s  not i�portant, or that the 
public•s interest in knowing certain inforeation is not impor­
tant,  but i t  is crucial to clarity in thinkin� about this issue 
that we di stin�uish the right to know as a back�round 
justification for the derivative and more specific l i be rty to 
speak and to write,  on the one hand, from the ri�ht to know 
aa having separate and independent force of its own. 
Hore coaruDnly1 however, the right t o  know is characteri�ed 
a llld claiaed as a positive right. ffere the claimant of the 
right to know is asking, or de1DSnding, something eore than Mere 
non-interference. Rather, he is claiming that some person or 
government affirmatively provide something; in particular, 
informat ion that the claiYBBnt would be unable to secure solely 
b y  his own devices. Even in this sense of a positive right, 
however, the right to know can take two forms. In the weak 
f o rm  the right to know is a claim of access to infonnation that 
already exists. For exa�ple1 the Freedom of Info?'1Dation Act,  
o r  any of the state analogues to this federal law, i s  a claim 
of access to certain documents and the like that have in fact 
been prepared for the government ' s  purposes independently of 
any citizen's desire to see the'll. Similarly, the various state 
open meeting laws , or "sunshine- laws, provide access to a 
meeti� that would take place even if no citizen had any 
interest whatsoever in attending.7 
By contrast, the strong form of a pos i tive right to know 
enca.passes t he  requirement that certain info?'1Dation be pro­
•ided regardless of whether that inf oriaation otherwise exists 
in some traneferable or tabulated fo?'1D. For example, a deaand 
t h at govern.ent provide reasons for i ts actions would be a 
demand for the creation rather than the .ere transf�r �f 
4
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inf onaat l o n .  a1'd thus vould coDStitute a clai• of the right to 
know in this strong s e 7'1!1 e .8 So too, under some circu.stancea, 
vould be s demand for public hearings vhere otbervise decisions 
vould be .. de in private by a sinJCle decisionn.aker. 
The exietenoe of the Freeda. of lnfor.ation Act and the 
various Sunahine Laws suggests that some facets of a right to 
know a.a a poeitive right requirin� positive action by �overn­
.ent already exist. In the seDS� of a legal right this is of 
courae tru e .  The right to know in the legel sense exists 
because o f  these lavs . Given the eKistence of certain 
statutes, a legal right to kn<M exists by definition, but that 
is quite different froa sayin� that the right to know exists 
independently of or superior to the1e specific lava. That i s ,  
i f  there were n o  such lava , would the notion of a right t o  knOlil 
support or at least provide an argument for the creation of 
lava like these; o r  would a right to know create judicially, 
politically, o r  .:>rally enforceable rights even in the absence 
of a statute.9 Thi& is a m1ch more difficult question, and one 
of the things that makes i t  aore difficult is that the right to 
know here is a right of a rather different order than most 
other rights, at least those rights that are part of American 
political theory. For in the conte•t of American political 
and legal institutions, ve are accustoaaied to thinking of 
negative ri�hts such as the right to free speech, and the 
right to free exercise of one ' s  religion, and ve are largely 
unfamiliar vith positive rights. For eKamp le, there are no 
positive rights in the United States Cons titution. Perhaps 
there should be ,  10 and perhaps, as it haa been argued , 1 1  
the free speech and free press clauses of the First Allllendment 
should be taken to support certain positive rights, but i t  must 
be recognized that this is a significant departure from the 
tradit ional conception of the role of rights in our particular 
sys tea. 
1 1  
The right to know i s  110at com11Dnly characterized in teTills 
of the publ ic 's right to know, and this suggests that any 
citizen po1sseasea the right to know simply by virtue of being a 
citiien. Assuming this to be the case, ..-hoe i s  the right to 
kn<1'f a right against? Vho is encumbered vith the correlative 
obligation that •kes tall< of rights meaningful? 
I s  the right to know, like .. ny other rights, a right 
against other citizeus? If this were the case, then claimanta 
of a right to know are asserting that other citiiene � them 
an obligation to provide certain information. This is not a 
totally iaplauaible clai•, and indeed it i• raised whenever a 
journalist employs the right to know as a ju•tification for 
seeking info?Wation fr<MI people who may become involved in 
events of general public interest, such as cri9M!a, natural 
d19aa ters , or strokes of good fortune such as winning f i r s t  
5
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prize in a state l�teYy. lut it eee9a1 difficult to accept the 
view that citiiens hav e ,  aa a correlative of the public'• right 
to know, an obligation or a dutz to provide to the public 
infonaation about theaael�e. Such a conclusion aight .. ke 
&ett8e i f  eveYything about ua were to be treated ea public 
prope rty, and i f  ve were to reject any value in privacy and 
in the citizen's decision to protect hia aut0110ny by retaining 
control over information about hi11&elf. lut these eee. rather 
extrea! c1ai.a. And i f  tte do not viah to accept the., then ve 
cannot eay that a citizen haa an obli�ation or a duty to 
p·rovide infonaation to the public abeent ao• particularized 
need requiri� special juatification. 12 l f ,  therefore , the 
correlative duty or obligation doea not exist, then the public 
does not in fact have a ri.'ht to know vi th respect to other 
.embers of the public. The public say viah to know. and the 
public 98y even have a legitiflate intet;;t in knowing , but in 
the absence of corresponding duty or obligation the public 
cannot be said to have a right to know vith reference to other 
.embers of the public. 
The foregoing argument appliea vith greatest force vith 
respect to ordinaYy citizeDB vho happen. fortuitou•ly. tc 
become involved in events of public interes t .  The argument is 
s·ubstantially weaker vhen applied to those vho are. to use the 
t,erminolo�y of the lav of l i be l . 13 pobUc figures. It la 
c011110nplace that certain people, by virtue of the role they 
play or the position they hold. have special obli�atione 
i·mpoeed upon the• by that role or position. 14 Such positionel 
obligations are held. for example, by phy aicia.na . by lawyers , 
by accountants. and by teachers . Perhap s ,  therefor e ,  public 
figures have positional obligations to provide information 
about the•selvea to the public in a vay that the ordinary 
citizen doea not ? The argutm!nt vould take the fol"9 of a claim 
that public figures perfon11 important public function&, and 
a.lao receive certain benefits from public recognition. In 
e·xchange for vhet they receive from the public, or as part of 
the duties they have voluntarily aeauall!d. therefore , public 
f igurea might be said to be under an obligation to expoae their 
lives and practices to public scrutiny. Thia le not the appro­
priate time to explore the full details of thie argument , nor 
the possible counterargu.enta that ialght be raised, but it la 
impoYtant to note that the arRu.ent . even in ite atrongeat 
for111, vould see• to be limited to those individoals vho 
voluntarily take on their particular public role. and vho also 
receive a special public benefit froai the aaau•ption of 
that role. Absent both of these conditions . there eee•s little 
reaaon to iapoae upon a .ember of the public a special 
ob1jgation to provide information about his life or his activi­
t i es .  for that seems to involve relinquiahing the control 
over per•onal information that ve properly conaider a central 
feature of our autonomy. 
AlthouRn necessaYy to establish the proper context , the 
previous diecuasion hes been a bit of a digression, because the 
6
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right to know, i� t : a  .oat cam.on a nd  .oat plausible fo�•. 
i • plies a correlative obli�ation not on the part of other 
c i ti2e09 ,  but on the part of govern-.en t .  The arguiment ta that 
the public haa a rt�ht to le.now, aa against gove l"'tJJlen t ,  about 
the vorktnge and dealt�• of that gove rn.e n t .  Aa I have 
me ntioned earlier, such a right now extata, a t  least in part, 
aa a legal right, the Freedoa of Infon.ation Act being the 
80at proainent exaaple . It t a  frequently argued aa vell that 
thia form of a right to know ta a cons titutional right, in that 
the Cotl9titution grants a right of a f f i r.a tive acceaa even tn 
the absence of legtalatton. 15 �1th the exception of t r i a l s ,  
hoveve r ,  t he  Supreme Court haa repeatedly rejected auch an 
tntet�retation of the Comstitution, 16 and one of the reaeotl9 
see .. to be that thie argued positive ri«ht fit• at bee: 
uncomfortably i n  a docuiment that ta almoat exclusively devoted 
to guarante·el� negative rights. 
Thie ie not the place to diacuae the particular -.erita or 
demerit• of particular Suprem Court caeee and doctrines. But 
even the absence of a judicially recogni%ed cotl9t1tutional 
right doea no� aiean that one cannot argue for the existence of 
a right to know, aa a g a i ns t  gove rmaent, aa a poli t ical right. 
What I mean by a political ri�ht ie • ri�ht that ta generated 
by the preauppoaitione of a political structure, and llhtch 
a t t aches to thoee liv1111( within that atructure. 17 The argument 
for the exte tence of euch a political right wou l d  take the form 
of an argument frat1 the underlytoa; aaauaptione of .. joritartan 
de90cracy. lf public officials are in fact public servants, 
then it would .. ke sense to say that a l l  of their actions 
should be subject to scrutiny by their .. acer·a, the public at 
large . 1 8  One troublesome point, howeve r ,  ia that the very eatne 
argument would allow the eame .. a t e re ,  tn the e�erciee of their 
sovereignty, to detetaine that there vaa certain tnf onaatton 
they did not viah to have, or that their agent• could be e t  
perform their taska i n  an at90aphere o f ,  if not darknes s ,  then 
at least aoaievhat limited aunehtne. Thia atght not be the 
o p t i  .. l policy for the .. jortty to follov, but if the majority 
chooeee, then i t  t e  dtfficQlt to aee how an argument from 
de1D0cracy can deny that power .  And if thia ia ao, then the eo­
called political right to know aay be no more than an interest 
in knowing, an intereat that the .ajority, in the exercise of 
i t a  sovereign powers, .. , at tiaaa chooee to subjugate to other 
intereata. 
Thia auggeata an additional problea. !ven if thia poli­
tical right to lc.n<JY does •�let, ie i t  an abaolute righ t ,  or, aa 
it ia ca.90nly called, only a pri aa  f acie rightT19 If the 
right ta abaolute, thta doea not aaan that it need cover evety 
poaaible aource of infot .. tion. IUgh ta .. , be absolute in 
atrength, or degree of protection, while attll being lilllited, 
perhaps even quite narrow, in acope, or coverage . But an 
abaolute right, vithin ita d01aain of coverage , cannot be over­
ridden by ot�r co:na iderationa. A priaa f acie ri�ht. on the 
other hand, ta leaa than absolute even vtthin t t a  area of 
coverage . Within that area of coverage • priaa facie right 
7
Schauer: Rights and the Right to Know
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1983
'IIGllTS ARD TH! IIQIT TO DiOW 71 
genera tee a strong, preeumptive reaa.on for following ita 
11Snda tes, vt\ich tn this caae vould be the diacloaure of tn­
foT"IMltion. But that �resu.ption &ight �11 b@ overcome in a 
particular case by even stronger conaiderations Iii litat tng 
against disclosure. ln the context of the right to know, it 
aeeaa difficult to say that thta right could plausibly be 
abeolute, even vithin a li-.dted d0taain of cover�e. Too .. ny 
exa•plea ca.e to mind in which the right to know aight be 
outwei�hed by particularly ca11pelling circuMStancee. Govern­
.enta have traditionally exagg.!rated clai..s of jeopardy to the 
national securi ty, but that do@e not mean that there are not 
instances tn which the national security llight seriously be 
threatened by the public disclosure of inforaation about 
weapons, troop 90ve-enta, intelligence activities, and 110 on. 
There are also instances, outside of the national security 
reala, tn which the live• and reputations of individual• llight 
be threatened by too much disclosure. Does the public have a 
right to know the namea of welfare recipients? What are the 
likely costs of the publi c ' s  having a right t o  coapelled 
disclosure of the names and whereabouts of undercover FBI 
agents investi�ati� organized crtae, or the American Nazi 
Party! The right to know, ae against �ove t'Nll!nt, see.a , at 
beat, a right of great strength that can still be overridden by 
pa1�icularly exigent circu11&tancea involving either enonaoua 
considerations of the general public interest ,  aa tn the 
national security caeea , or threats to other rights, aa where 
individual life, liberty, or perhaps reputation ia at iaaue . 20 
Even if there ta a right to know, it hardly follows that it ta 
the only right, or that it ia necessarily stronger than all 
other rights. 
I l l  
With acme of these distinctions in place, i t  i e  now poe­
ai ble to consider the extent , if at a l l ,  that jou·rneliata have 
some special role to play vith reference to the right to know. 
Kore part icularly, the prilUry question ie whether the journa­
l i s t  hae some special right qua journeliat, one that ia not 
shared by the general public but instead relates tn eome 
part icular vay to those who act aa journal i s t s .  
I t  t a  of course q u i t e  possible that the public, and each 
and every ml!mber of i t ,  hae a right to know, but that journa­
l i s ts have no rights �yond those they enjoy 111!rely ae citt­
z e na .  Thia ta not to eay that even in thie caee journalists 
might not have special reasons for exercising these rights with 
greater vi�or and greater frequency than citizens vho do not 
happen to be journaliete, but that ie quite different fro. 
saying that journeliata have rights not enjoyed by all other 
m!m�re of the public should they vtah to exercise them. 
Thu e ,  i f  there ia a right t o  k n ow ,  i t  by n o  1Eane neces­
sarily follovs that it grants anything special to journalists. 
8
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Indeed, it see.is qllite justifiable to deny to journaliata any 
apecial right to know beyond that arguably enjoyed by the 
�ublic at large . 1irat of all. it ia a td.atake to aasume that 
all or even 90at dialogue about public affairs takea pla,ce in 
or through the 11&aa media. 2 1 There ia aa •uch discussion of 
current events aod -ttens of public concern in bar•. in pool 
balla, in berber ahopa, and at dinner part!� aa anywhere elae, 
and once we realize tbe extent of political discourse outside 
the ...  11edia i t  can be seen that the journalist perfonaa an 
i•pcn:�ant but by no meana �elusive function in society. More­
ove r, there are aubstantial def initional proble .. involved in 
trying to detexldne vho ta to hold thia argued special right. 
Are authors of boeke included along with reporters for ueva ­
paper• , 1Mga�tnee. aad the electronic media? If ao, then vhat 
about the author of hia f iret book, currently doing background 
re.earch? Theee definitional proble1119 are not. of cours e ,  in­
aurw>untable .  � are accustomed to drawing lines even in the 
abeen� of hard and faat d1atinctioll9. But once 11e recognize 
that ve .. , be drawing relatively arbitrary line• for the pur­
pose of ease of interpretation and enforcement, ve are enga�ed 
in a proceaa that atrikea more, to use Ronald Dworkin'• terain­
ology, of policy than of principle. 22 Thua, t o  the extent that 
ve are forced to drav lines baaed pri .. rily on convenience , it 
appears that ve are talk.inf( at beat about intereata, and not 
about right• in any atrong aense. 
To the extent that journaliata, however defined, can be 
aaid to have apecial righta to know beyond and diatinct from 
thoae held by the general public. then theae rights vould aeem 
t o  be pre•iaed on the role of tbe journalist aa in ao.e aenae a 
truatee for the public at large . The public, the primaty 
holder of the right to know under any plausible forwulation. 
can be aaid under thia theory to have specially entrusted aolM 
of these ri�hta to journaliata in order that the public can be 
better infonNd and the public interest be better aerved. Yet 
i f  under tbia theory the journalis t  ta acting on behalf of the 
public, additional proble .. preaent the .. elvea . If a journa­
liat diacovera information in hia capacity aa guardian of thia 
apecial right to know, 1• he therefore obligated to provide 
that iafonMttion to the public? Would it be poasible for ao!M­
one to •tue the Mew York Tim.!a for not publiahiag the Pent&Ron 
Pape ra · 1 23 In other vorda , doe• the public have an enforceable 
right a�i'DBt the journaliat to the raleaae of any inforaation 
diacOYered in the courae o f  clAiaing or enforc:iag the public '• 
rilht to knowT Siailarly, does the pub lic have a riiltt. ala1n 
enforceable agai'IWt the journaliat, to have the jovrnaltet ob­
tain information that the journ•Uat., ldght not viah to obt•in! 
O t  doea the �u\,llc bave a right a�aiut thA journalist to dis­
closure of information at a certain ti�, or in a certain vay. 
aa for eKample with enforceable at•.tarda of objectivity? I 
v�d espect that .oat j ournaliata would recoil i n  horror at 
I OM  of th•e augpat1ons, and indeed a o  do I. Thay are pre­
••llt•d to demomtrate that there •'Y be derivative righta that 
9
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attach to too strong a recognition o f  the view that the 
journalist perfor1111 a special function as trustee of the 
publJ c •s right to know. 
Grantiotl specisl rights to journalists .ay be said to 
juetify i•poeing special responsibilities as ve 1 1 . 24 Cam:mon 
usage notwithstandi ng ,  i t  is of course true that there ia no 
logical connection between rights and reeponsibtlittes in this 
sense. Neither logic nor language are affronted if ve grant , 
create, or recottniie rights in some person without at t�e ssme 
time impoaing on that person any special duties, obli�ations, 
or responsibi lities. The popular saying that rights carty 
responsibilities is not a aatter of logical entailment. Many 
rights auch ae the ri�ht to free speech, are often exerci.aed 
irresponsibly, and we expect that this will be the case. 2 5  But 
when we are talking about granting rights to certain classes of 
people beyond those rights held by the general public, the 
argu..ent that responsibilities ought to be imposed aa well 
bee�• 110re ccmpelling. Can the public require that thoae it 
entrusts with protecting and enforcing its right to know meet 
cet�ain standards of training, knowledge , diligence, and 
objectivity? Can the public choose to create a 11echani am for 
judicial enf orcentent of these responsibilities and obligations? 
Can special rights be withdrawn i f  the right-holder doea not 
llM!&aure up to certain atandarda of perf onaance? 
Again, these sugge s tions aound quite uncomfortable , and I 
submit that one �eason for thia ia that there ia some tenaion 
be�en the role of journali st as trustee for the publ i c ' s  
right to know, and more traditional conceptions of freedom of 
speech and freedo� of the press. Apart from the question of 
whether objective reporting i s  even possible, aany illllport.ant 
goala are served by non-objective journ alism, which we would 
no"'8lly ca l l  advocacy. The goals of public knowledge and 
involvement aay be better served by the exchange of adversary 
positio0& than by everyone's disclaiming personal involvement 
and clai•ing to be objective and impart i a l .  Whether this is 
true or not, · at least it fits quite well with our 
traditional ·marketplace of ideas· conception of freedom of 
speech and freedam of the press. I am unc�fortable 
with the notion that the New York Times, CBS Neva, or Time 
•agazine should have rights greater than those enjoyed 
by The Daily Worke r ,  the National "Review, or the Village Voice, 
yet none of the latter liat of publications would deny that 
they have a particular political or moral point of view. But I 
am equally uncomfortable with the idea that the National Review 
or The DailyWorker should be granted apecial rights because 
they are representing ,.., interests or ti� interests of the pub­
lic in general . But this is of course a falae dileml!Ml, created 
only if ve assume that special rights for journalists must ex­
i s t .  We need not follow that cour s e ,  and ve can rely, as we 
have done in the paat, on allowing journalists, for whatever 
their reaao-aa, to use only thoae general rights available to 
a l l  of us by virtue of our citi�e"8hip. By adopting that poai-
10
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tion, ve not onlv avoid so� of the difficult li ne-dravin� pro­
ble .. ..  nt ioned above , but we also avoid sacrificing -..ch of 
the independence of the press to the Uluaory· mandates of a 
right to know. 
IV 
Jn atte•pting to explore the terrain of the public 's ri�ht 
to know, I have P<>•ed a large number of proble.s and q ue a t ions, 
dravn probably too many dis tinctions, and provided very few 
a"8vera. The .eaaage, and there is a 11eeeage, hoveve r, ia 
simple . When journali s t s ,  or ve as �mbers of the general 
public, clailll a right to knew, we are making a claim of special 
force. Aaaertillg a c l a i m  of right. as opposed merely to 
alleging an interest, or aound policy, ought therefore to 
require eapecially atrong j u a t 1 f icationa. To the extent that 
all interests or •goods· are couched in the language of rights, 
we dilute and therefore cheapen the notion of riihte. Rights 
are important precisely because they trump the nor.al policy 
corwideratione ve uae in making .oat personal and gove rnmental 
deciaione. But 1f all of t h e  suite are trump, we discover that 
ve are playing at no trump. To avoid t h 1 a ,  both the concept 
a nd  languge of rights need to be reaerved for those consider­
atione that carry with them special and coepelling .oral or 
political j u a t i f i c a t i o ne .  The all too com111>n move from •rt is 
good to have !." to ·There is a right to x damages the very 
reason for r ecognt z i  ng ri�hta at all . It may be t_hat the 
special and compe l l i ng  justifications neceaaary for recogn.idng 
the existence of a r1�ht are preaent in the case of the right 
to know, but establishing this w i l l  require greater attention 
to aome o f  the distinctions diacusaed above than haa tradi­
tionally been the caae. 
l • 
2 .  
3 .  
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